This research will discuss the reduction between Husserl and Merloponte, where
reductionism is one of the elements of Husserl’s phenomenological approach, which is the
way the transcendental ego is used to reach the anemones. Phenomenology has infl
uenced
many of the later philosophies, especially existentialism, where the latter attempted to
apply Phenomenology from the arena of feeling to the realm of existence, and Merloponte
as existential philosopher of the Phenomenology applied to his philosophy. This research
will focus on how Husserl and Merloponte treated the reduction, and what are the points of
intersection and difference between the philosophers. This research addresses the meaning
of the Pythagorean and phoenomological and Mahawe reduction in each, and how
Merloponte achieved a leap and overcome Husserl in a manner consistent with his
philosophy based on perception.
Deconstruction tries to disrupt the transcendental signification and its domination on
the other implications by introducing a new concept: the concept of free play of the
marque. This concept is based on the philosophy of the otherness and differe
nce. Derrida
never stooped to remind that the difference is not a concept or an idea or a term. We see
the difference as Law, a Law of reading and writing. But it's also the Law of the Other and
the different. It reflectsa philosophy of otherness that is rooted in the writings of Derrida.
Derrida expressed this Law by a formulation that reduces deconstruction as a philosophy
and as a method: tout autre est tout autre, a sentence that says the identity and the
otherness together. It says the identity, and says the other, each other, the other in his
irreducible plurality, the other "is" different and we cannot tell his identity. Peerless
formulation of the Law that says the impossible.
The purpose of this article is to examine the possibility of immediate against mediated or theoretical knowledge. However, in both types of knowledge, there is a face to face confrontation. I encounter something which I wish to apprehend. Therefore,
aspiration already assumes a duality, a gulf between me and that which faces me. The object is, as it were, already there, autonomous, present as a fact. This is, of course, a basic tenet of positivism and empiricism. The world as summation of all its possible contents is simply 'given'. This article also tries to enquire a little further into this perspective, questioning the nature of this objectivity exploring possible ambiguities. I shall be looking mostly at Kantian transcendentalism and Husserlian and Merleapontian phenomenology.
This research deals with the religious experience from the
phenomenological point of view. The method used in this investigation
will be descriptive aiming at the arrival to essences concerning this kind
of lived experiences. Description does not
refer to simple and neutral, but
refers firstly to the "epoch" to the natural attitude and pass over towards
phenomenological reduction. This will permit us to perceive the essences
of the experiences, ie. What is aimed by phenomenological method.
