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تسجيل مستخدم جديدExperiments with Game Tree Search in Real-Time Strategy Games
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Santiago Ontanon
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Game tree search algorithms such as minimax have been used with enormous success in turn-based adversarial games such as Chess or Checkers. However, such algorithms cannot be directly applied to real-time strategy (RTS) games because a number of reasons. For example, minimax assumes a turn-taking game mechanics, not present in RTS games. In this paper we present RTMM, a real-time variant of the standard minimax algorithm, and discuss its applicability in the context of RTS games. We discuss its strengths and weaknesses, and evaluate it in two real-time games.
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