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تسجيل مستخدم جديدAn extremum seeking algorithm for monotone Nash equilibrium problems
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In this paper we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) via zeroth-order feedback information in games with merely monotone pseudogradient mapping. Based on hybrid system theory, we propose a novel extremum seeking algorithm which converges to the set of Nash equilibria in a semi-global practical sense. Finally, we present two simulation examples. The first shows that the standard extremum seeking algorithm fails, while ours succeeds in reaching NE. In the second, we simulate an allocation problem with fixed demand.
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