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تسجيل مستخدم جديدDistributed Generalized Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Energy Sharing Games
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With the proliferation of distributed generators and energy storage systems, traditional passive consumers in power systems have been gradually evolving into the so-called prosumers, i.e., proactive consumers, which can both produce and consume power. To encourage energy exchange among prosumers, energy sharing is increasingly adopted, which is usually formulated as a generalized Nash game (GNG). In this paper, a distributed approach is proposed to seek the Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the energy sharing game. To this end, we convert the GNG into an equivalent optimization problem. A Krasnoselski{v{i}}-Mann iteration type algorithm is thereby devised to solve the problem and consequently find the GNE in a distributed manner. The convergence of the proposed algorithm is proved rigorously based on the nonexpansive operator theory. The performance of the algorithm is validated by experiments with three prosumers, and the scalability is tested by simulations using 123 prosumers.
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