اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدNear-Optimal Evasion of Convex-Inducing Classifiers
325
0
0.0
(
0
)
نشر من قبل
Benjamin Rubinstein
تاريخ النشر
2010
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
والبحث باللغة
English
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Classifiers are often used to detect miscreant activities. We study how an adversary can efficiently query a classifier to elicit information that allows the adversary to evade detection at near-minimal cost. We generalize results of Lowd and Meek (2005) to convex-inducing classifiers. We present algorithms that construct undetected instances of near-minimal cost using only polynomially many queries in the dimension of the space and without reverse engineering the decision boundary.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Classifiers are often used to detect miscreant activities. We study how an adversary can systematically query a classifier to elicit information that allows the adversary to evade detection while incurring a near-minimal cost of modifying their inten
ded malfeasance. We generalize the theory of Lowd and Meek (2005) to the family of convex-inducing classifiers that partition input space into two sets one of which is convex. We present query algorithms for this family that construct undetected instances of approximately minimal cost using only polynomially-many queries in the dimension of the space and in the level of approximation. Our results demonstrate that near-optimal evasion can be accomplished without reverse-engineering the classifiers decision boundary. We also consider general lp costs and show that near-optimal evasion on the family of convex-inducing classifiers is generally efficient for both positive and negative convexity for all levels of approximation if p=1.
Classifier evasion consists in finding for a given instance $x$ the nearest instance $x$ such that the classifier predictions of $x$ and $x$ are different. We present two novel algorithms for systematically computing evasions for tree ensembles such
as boosted trees and random forests. Our first algorithm uses a Mixed Integer Linear Program solver and finds the optimal evading instance under an expressive set of constraints. Our second algorithm trades off optimality for speed by using symbolic prediction, a novel algorithm for fast finite differences on tree ensembles. On a digit recognition task, we demonstrate that both gradient boosted trees and random forests are extremely susceptible to evasions. Finally, we harden a boosted tree model without loss of predictive accuracy by augmenting the training set of each boosting round with evading instances, a technique we call adversarial boosting.
Evasion attack in multi-label learning systems is an interesting, widely witnessed, yet rarely explored research topic. Characterizing the crucial factors determining the attackability of the multi-label adversarial threat is the key to interpret the
origin of the adversarial vulnerability and to understand how to mitigate it. Our study is inspired by the theory of adversarial risk bound. We associate the attackability of a targeted multi-label classifier with the regularity of the classifier and the training data distribution. Beyond the theoretical attackability analysis, we further propose an efficient empirical attackability estimator via greedy label space exploration. It provides provably computational efficiency and approximation accuracy. Substantial experimental results on real-world datasets validate the unveiled attackability factors and the effectiveness of the proposed empirical attackability indicator
We study differentially private (DP) algorithms for stochastic convex optimization (SCO). In this problem the goal is to approximately minimize the population loss given i.i.d. samples from a distribution over convex and Lipschitz loss functions. A l
ong line of existing work on private convex optimization focuses on the empirical loss and derives asymptotically tight bounds on the excess empirical loss. However a significant gap exists in the known bounds for the population loss. We show that, up to logarithmic factors, the optimal excess population loss for DP algorithms is equal to the larger of the optimal non-private excess population loss, and the optimal excess empirical loss of DP algorithms. This implies that, contrary to intuition based on private ERM, private SCO has asymptotically the same rate of $1/sqrt{n}$ as non-private SCO in the parameter regime most common in practice. The best previous result in this setting gives rate of $1/n^{1/4}$. Our approach builds on existing differentially private algorithms and relies on the analysis of algorithmic stability to ensure generalization.
We investigate how an adversary can optimally use its query budget for targeted evasion attacks against deep neural networks in a black-box setting. We formalize the problem setting and systematically evaluate what benefits the adversary can gain by
using substitute models. We show that there is an exploration-exploitation tradeoff in that query efficiency comes at the cost of effectiveness. We present two new attack strategies for using substitute models and show that they are as effective as previous query-only techniques but require significantly fewer queries, by up to three orders of magnitude. We also show that an agile adversary capable of switching through different attack techniques can achieve pareto-optimal efficiency. We demonstrate our attack against Google Cloud Vision showing that the difficulty of black-box attacks against real-world prediction APIs is significantly easier than previously thought (requiring approximately 500 queries instead of approximately 20,000 as in previous works).
الأسئلة المقترحة
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
