اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدAn Energy Sharing Game with Generalized Demand Bidding: Model and Properties
77
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
This paper proposes a novel energy sharing mechanism for prosumers who can produce and consume. Different from most existing works, the role of individual prosumer as a seller or buyer in our model is endogenously determined. Several desirable properties of the proposed mechanism are proved based on a generalized game-theoretic model. We show that the Nash equilibrium exists and is the unique solution of an equivalent convex optimization problem. The sharing price at the Nash equilibrium equals to the average marginal disutility of all prosumers. We also prove that every prosumer has the incentive to participate in the sharing market, and prosumers total cost decreases with increasing absolute value of price sensitivity. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium approaches the social optimal as the number of prosumers grows, and competition can improve social welfare.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
We develop a novel optimization model to maximize the profit of a Demand-Side Platform (DSP) while ensuring that the budget utilization preferences of the DSPs advertiser clients are adequately met. Our model is highly flexible and can be applied in
a Real-Time Bidding environment (RTB) with arbitrary auction types, e.g., both first and second price auctions. Our proposed formulation leads to a non-convex optimization problem due to the joint optimization over both impression allocation and bid price decisions. Using Fenchel duality theory, we construct a dual problem that is convex and can be solved efficiently to obtain feasible bidding prices and allocation variables that can be deployed in a RTB setting. With a few minimal additional assumptions on the properties of the auctions, we demonstrate theoretically that our computationally efficient procedure based on convex optimization principles is guaranteed to deliver a globally optimal solution. We conduct experiments using data from a real DSP to validate our theoretical findings and to demonstrate that our method successfully trades off between DSP profitability and budget utilization in a simulated online environment.
Energy storage is expected to play an increasingly important role in mitigating variations that come along with the growing penetration of renewable energy. In this paper, we study the optimal bidding of an energy storage unit in a semi-centralized m
arket. The energy storage unit offers its available storage capacity and maximum charging/ discharging rate to the operator; then the operator clears the real-time market by minimizing the total cost. The energy storage unit is paid/ charged at locational marginal price (LMP). The problem casts down to a bilevel optimization problem with a mixed-integer lower-level. An improved surrogate-based method with the combined spatial-temporal entropy term is developed to solve this problem. Numerical examples demonstrate the scalability, efficiency, and accuracy of the proposed method.
With the advent of prosumers, the traditional centralized operation may become impracticable due to computational burden, privacy concerns, and conflicting interests. In this paper, an energy sharing mechanism is proposed to accommodate prosumers str
ategic decision-making on their self-production and demand in the presence of capacity constraints. Under this setting, prosumers play a generalized Nash game. We prove main properties of the game: an equilibrium exists and is partially unique; no prosumer is worse off by energy sharing and the price-of-anarchy is 1-O(1/I) where I is the number of prosumers. In particular, the PoA tends to 1 with a growing number of prosumers, meaning that the resulting total cost under the proposed energy sharing approaches social optimum. We prove that the corresponding prosumers strategies converge to the social optimal solution as well. Finally we propose a bidding process and prove that it converges to the energy sharing equilibrium under mild conditions. Illustrative examples are provided to validate the results.
Animals use a wide variety of strategies to reduce or avoid aggression in conflicts over resources. These strategies range from sharing resources without outward signs of conflict to the development of dominance hierarchies, in which initial fighting
is followed by the submission of subordinates. Although models have been developed to analyze specific strategies for resolving conflicts over resources, little work has focused on trying to understand why particular strategies are more likely to arise in certain situations. In this paper, we use a model based on an iterated Hawk--Dove game to analyze how resource holding potentials (RHPs) and other factors affect whether sharing, dominance relationships, or other behaviours are evolutionarily stable. We find through extensive numerical simulations that sharing is stable only when the cost of fighting is low and the animals in a contest have similar RHPs, whereas dominance relationships are stable in most other situations. We also explore what happens when animals are unable to assess each others RHPs without fighting, and we compare a range of strategies for this problem using simulations. We find (1) that the most successful strategies involve a limited period of assessment followed by a stable relationship in which fights are avoided and (2) that the duration of assessment depends both on the costliness of fighting and on the difference between the animals RHPs. Along with our direct work on modeling and simulations, we develop extensive software to facilitate further testing; it is available at url{https://bitbucket.org/CameronLHall/dominancesharingassessmentmatlab/}.
Mobile Edge Caching is a promising technique to enhance the content delivery quality and reduce the backhaul link congestion, by storing popular content at the network edge or mobile devices (e.g. base stations and smartphones) that are proximate to
content requesters. In this work, we study a novel mobile edge caching framework, which enables mobile devices to cache and share popular contents with each other via device-to-device (D2D) links. We are interested in the following incentive problem of mobile device users: whether and which users are willing to cache and share what contents, taking the user mobility and cost/reward into consideration. The problem is challenging in a large-scale network with a large number of users. We introduce the evolutionary game theory, an effective tool for analyzing large-scale dynamic systems, to analyze the mobile users content caching and sharing strategies. Specifically, we first derive the users best caching and sharing strategies, and then analyze how these best strategies change dynamically over time, based on which we further characterize the system equilibrium systematically. Simulation results show that the proposed caching scheme outperforms the existing schemes in terms of the total transmission cost and the cellular load. In particular, in our simulation, the total transmission cost can be reduced by 42.5%-55.2% and the cellular load can be reduced by 21.5%-56.4%.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
