اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدSequential evacuation strategy for multiple rooms toward the same means of egress
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This paper examines different evacuation strategies for systems where several rooms evacuate trough the same means of egress, using microscopic pedestrian simulation.As a case study, a medium-rise office building is considered. It was found that the standard strategy, whereby the simultaneous evacuation of all levels is performed, can be improved by a sequential evacuation, beginning with the lowest floor and continuing successively with each one of the upper floors after a certain delay. The importance of the present research is that it provides the basis for the design and implementation of new evacuation strategies and alarm systems that could significantly improve the evacuation of multiple rooms trough a common means of escape.
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