اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدFrom Language Games to Drawing Games
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نشر من قبل
Chrisantha Fernando Dr
تاريخ النشر
2020
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الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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We attempt to automate various artistic processes by inventing a set of drawing games, analogous to the approach taken by emergent language research in inventing communication games. A critical difference is that drawing games demand much less effort from the receiver than do language games. Artists must work with pre-trained viewers who spend little time learning artist specific representational conventions, but who instead have a pre-trained visual system optimized for behaviour in the world by understanding to varying extents the environments visual affordances. After considering various kinds of drawing game we present some preliminary experiments which have generated images by closing the generative-critical loop.
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