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تسجيل مستخدم جديدStopper-Controller Games embedded in Single-Player Control Problems
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In 2002, Benjamin Jourdain and Claude Martini discovered that for a class of payoff functions, the pricing problem for American options can be reduced to pricing of European options for an appropriately associated payoff, all within a Black-Scholes framework. This discovery has been investigated in great detail by Soren Christensen, Jan Kallsen and Matthias Lenga in a recent work in 2020. In the present work we prove that this phenomenon can be observed in a wider context, and even holds true in a setup of non-linear stochastic processes. We analyse this problem from both probabilistic and analytic viewpoints. In the classical situation, Jourdain and Martini used this method to approximate prices of American put options. The broader applicability now potentially covers non-linear frameworks such as model uncertainty and controller-and-stopper-games.
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