اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدGovernment as Network Catalyst: Accelerating Self-Organization in a Strategic Industry
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Governments have long standing interests in preventing market failures and enhancing innovation in strategic industries. Public policy regarding domestic technology is critical to both national security and economic prosperity. Governments often seek to enhance their global competitiveness by promoting private sector cooperative activity at the inter-organizational level. Research on network governance has illuminated the structure of boundary-spanning collaboration mainly for programs with immediate public or non-profit objectives. Far less research has examined how governments might accelerate private sector cooperation to prevent market failures or to enhance innovation. The theoretical contribution of this research is to suggest that government programs might catalyze cooperative activity by accelerating the preferential attachment mechanism inherent in social networks. We analyze the long-term effects of a government program on the strategic alliance network of 451 organizations in the high-tech semiconductor industry between 1987 and 1999, using stochastic network analysis methods for longitudinal social networks.
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