اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدProtecting shared information in networks: a network security game with strategic attacks
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A digital security breach, by which confidential information is leaked, does not only affect the agent whose system is infiltrated, but is also detrimental to other agents socially connected to the infiltrated system. Although it has been argued that these externalities create incentives to under-invest in security, this presumption is challenged by the possibility of strategic adversaries that attack the least protected agents. In this paper we study a new model of security games in which agents share tokens of sensitive information in a network of contacts. The agents have the opportunity to invest in security to protect against an attack that can be either strategically or randomly targeted. We show that, in the presence of random attack, under-investments always prevail at the Nash equilibrium in comparison with the social optimum. Instead, when the attack is strategic, either under-investments or over-investments are possible, depending on the network topology and on the characteristics of the process of the spreading of information. Actually, agents invest more in security than socially optimal when dependencies among agents are low (which can happen because the information network is sparsely connected or because the probability that information tokens are shared is small). These over-investments pass on to under-investments when information sharing is more likely (and therefore, when the risk brought by the attack is higher).
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