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Humans tend to learn complex abstract concepts faster if examples are presented in a structured manner. For instance, when learning how to play a board game, usually one of the first concepts learned is how the game ends, i.e. the actions that lead to a terminal state (win, lose or draw). The advantage of learning end-games first is that once the actions which lead to a terminal state are understood, it becomes possible to incrementally learn the consequences of actions that are further away from a terminal state - we call this an end-game-first curriculum. Currently the state-of-the-art machine learning player for general board games, AlphaZero by Google DeepMind, does not employ a structured training curriculum; instead learning from the entire game at all times. By employing an end-game-first training curriculum to train an AlphaZero inspired player, we empirically show that the rate of learning of an artificial player can be improved during the early stages of training when compared to a player not using a training curriculum.
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) has shown great empirical successes, but suffers from brittleness and sample inefficiency. A potential remedy is to use a previously-trained policy as a source of supervision. In this work, we refer to these policies
Robust Reinforcement Learning aims to find the optimal policy with some extent of robustness to environmental dynamics. Existing learning algorithms usually enable the robustness through disturbing the current state or simulating environmental parame
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have great expressive power, which can even memorize samples with wrong labels. It is vitally important to reiterate robustness and generalization in DNNs against label corruption. To this end, this paper studies the 0-1 l
Despite many algorithmic advances, our theoretical understanding of practical distributional reinforcement learning methods remains limited. One exception is Rowland et al. (2018)s analysis of the C51 algorithm in terms of the Cramer distance, but th
We consider the problem of learning to behave optimally in a Markov Decision Process when a reward function is not specified, but instead we have access to a set of demonstrators of varying performance. We assume the demonstrators are classified into