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Selling Complementary Goods: Dynamics, Efficiency and Revenue

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 نشر من قبل Liad Blumrosen
 تاريخ النشر 2017
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
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We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum of prices. This is a classic model by Cournot (1838), who showed that in this setting a monopoly that sells both goods is better for the society than two competing sellers. We show that non-trivial pure Nash equilibria always exist in this game. We also quantify Cournots observation with respect to both the optimal welfare and the monopoly revenue. We then prove a series of mostly negative results regarding the convergence of best response dynamics to equilibria in such games.



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