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تسجيل مستخدم جديدWelfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium
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We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes. Given the widespread use of bundling in real-life markets, we study its role as a stabilizing and coordinating device by considering the notion of emph{competitive bundling equilibrium}: a competitive equilibrium over the market induced by partitioning the goods for sale into fixed bundles. Compared to other equilibrium concepts involving bundles, this notion has the advantage of simulatneous succinctness ($O(m)$ prices) and market clearance. Our first set of results concern welfare guarantees. We show that in markets where consumers care only about the number of goods they receive (known as multi-unit or homogeneous markets), even in the presence of complementarities, there always exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that guarantees a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare, and this guarantee is tight. We also establish non-trivial welfare guarantees for general markets, two-consumer markets, and markets where the consumer valuations are additive up to a fixed budget (budget-additive). Our second set of results concern revenue guarantees. Motivated by the fact that the revenue extracted in a standard competitive equilibrium may be zero (even with simple unit-demand consumers), we show that for natural subclasses of gross substitutes valuations, there always exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that extracts a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare, and this guarantee is tight. The notion of competitive bundling equilibrium can thus be useful even in markets which possess a standard competitive equilibrium.
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