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تسجيل مستخدم جديدLearning Simple Auctions
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We present a general framework for proving polynomial sample complexity bounds for the problem of learning from samples the best auction in a class of simple auctions. Our framework captures all of the most prominent examples of simple auctions, including anonymous and non-anonymous item and bundle pricings, with either a single or multiple buyers. The technique we propose is to break the analysis of auctions into two natural pieces. First, one shows that the set of allocation rules have large amounts of structure; second, fixing an allocation on a sample, one shows that the set of auctions agreeing with this allocation on that sample have revenue functions with low dimensionality. Our results effectively imply that whenever its possible to compute a near-optimal simple auction with a known prior, it is also possible to compute such an auction with an unknown prior (given a polynomial number of samples).
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