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تسجيل مستخدم جديدGeneralization Guarantees for Multi-item Profit Maximization: Pricing, Auctions, and Randomized Mechanisms
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We study the design of multi-item mechanisms that maximize expected profit with respect to a distribution over buyers values. In practice, a full description of the distribution is typically unavailable. Therefore, we study the setting where the designer only has samples from the distribution and the goal is to find a high-profit mechanism within a class of mechanisms. If the class is complex, a mechanism may have high average profit over the samples but low expected profit. This raises the question: how many samples are sufficient to ensure that a mechanisms average profit is close to its expected profit? To answer this question, we uncover structure shared by many pricing, auction, and lottery mechanisms: for any set of buyers values, profit is piecewise linear in the mechanisms parameters. Using this structure, we prove new bounds for mechanism classes not yet studied in the sample-based mechanism design literature and match or improve over the best known guarantees for many classes. Finally, we provide tools for optimizing an important tradeoff: more complex mechanisms typically have higher average profit over the samples than simpler mechanisms, but more samples are required to ensure that average profit nearly matches expected profit.
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