No Arabic abstract
How users in a dynamic system perform learning and make decision become more and more important in numerous research fields. Although there are some works in the social learning literatures regarding how to construct belief on an uncertain system state, few study has been conducted on incorporating social learning with decision making. Moreover, users may have multiple concurrent decisions on different objects/resources and their decisions usually negatively influence each others utility, which makes the problem even more challenging. In this paper, we propose an Indian Buffet Game to study how users in a dynamic system learn the uncertain system state and make multiple concurrent decisions by not only considering the current myopic utility, but also taking into account the influence of subsequent users decisions. We analyze the proposed Indian Buffet Game under two different scenarios: customers request multiple dishes without budget constraint and with budget constraint. For both cases, we design recursive best response algorithms to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for customers and characterize special properties of the Nash equilibrium profile under homogeneous setting. Moreover, we introduce a non-Bayesian social learning algorithm for customers to learn the system state, and theoretically prove its convergence. Finally, we conduct simulations to validate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed algorithms.
We place an Indian Buffet process (IBP) prior over the structure of a Bayesian Neural Network (BNN), thus allowing the complexity of the BNN to increase and decrease automatically. We further extend this model such that the prior on the structure of each hidden layer is shared globally across all layers, using a Hierarchical-IBP (H-IBP). We apply this model to the problem of resource allocation in Continual Learning (CL) where new tasks occur and the network requires extra resources. Our model uses online variational inference with reparameterisation of the Bernoulli and Beta distributions, which constitute the IBP and H-IBP priors. As we automatically learn the number of weights in each layer of the BNN, overfitting and underfitting problems are largely overcome. We show empirically that our approach offers a competitive edge over existing methods in CL.
In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning method is proposed. In the proposed game-theoretic method, agents only need to communicate their binary decisions rather than the real-valued beliefs with their neighbors, which endows the method with low communication complexity. Under mean field approximations, we theoretically analyze the steady state equilibria of the game and show that the evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) coincide with the decisions of the benchmark centralized detector. Numerical experiments are implemented to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretic learning method.
We study non-Bayesian social learning on random directed graphs and show that under mild connectivity assumptions, all the agents almost surely learn the true state of the world asymptotically in time if the sequence of the associated weighted adjacency matrices belongs to Class $pstar$ (a broad class of stochastic chains that subsumes uniformly strongly connected chains). We show that uniform strong connectivity, while being unnecessary for asymptotic learning, ensures that all the agents beliefs converge to a consensus almost surely, even when the true state is not identifiable. We then provide a few corollaries of our main results, some of which apply to variants of the original update rule such as inertial non-Bayesian learning and learning via diffusion and adaptation. Others include extensions of known results on social learning. We also show that, if the network of influences is balanced in a certain sense, then asymptotic learning occurs almost surely even in the absence of uniform strong connectivity.
We study a model of information aggregation and social learning recently proposed by Jadbabaie, Sandroni, and Tahbaz-Salehi, in which individual agents try to learn a correct state of the world by iteratively updating their beliefs using private observations and beliefs of their neighbors. No individual agents private signal might be informative enough to reveal the unknown state. As a result, agents share their beliefs with others in their social neighborhood to learn from each other. At every time step each agent receives a private signal, and computes a Bayesian posterior as an intermediate belief. The intermediate belief is then averaged with the belief of neighbors to form the individuals belief at next time step. We find a set of minimal sufficient conditions under which the agents will learn the unknown state and reach consensus on their beliefs without any assumption on the private signal structure. The key enabler is a result that shows that using this update, agents will eventually forecast the indefinite future correctly.
Latent feature models are attractive for image modeling, since images generally contain multiple objects. However, many latent feature models ignore that objects can appear at different locations or require pre-segmentation of images. While the transformed Indian buffet process (tIBP) provides a method for modeling transformation-invariant features in unsegmented binary images, its current form is inappropriate for real images because of its computational cost and modeling assumptions. We combine the tIBP with likelihoods appropriate for real images and develop an efficient inference, using the cross-correlation between images and features, that is theoretically and empirically faster than existing inference techniques. Our method discovers reasonable components and achieve effective image reconstruction in natural images.