No Arabic abstract
We study non-Bayesian social learning on random directed graphs and show that under mild connectivity assumptions, all the agents almost surely learn the true state of the world asymptotically in time if the sequence of the associated weighted adjacency matrices belongs to Class $pstar$ (a broad class of stochastic chains that subsumes uniformly strongly connected chains). We show that uniform strong connectivity, while being unnecessary for asymptotic learning, ensures that all the agents beliefs converge to a consensus almost surely, even when the true state is not identifiable. We then provide a few corollaries of our main results, some of which apply to variants of the original update rule such as inertial non-Bayesian learning and learning via diffusion and adaptation. Others include extensions of known results on social learning. We also show that, if the network of influences is balanced in a certain sense, then asymptotic learning occurs almost surely even in the absence of uniform strong connectivity.
We study a model of information aggregation and social learning recently proposed by Jadbabaie, Sandroni, and Tahbaz-Salehi, in which individual agents try to learn a correct state of the world by iteratively updating their beliefs using private observations and beliefs of their neighbors. No individual agents private signal might be informative enough to reveal the unknown state. As a result, agents share their beliefs with others in their social neighborhood to learn from each other. At every time step each agent receives a private signal, and computes a Bayesian posterior as an intermediate belief. The intermediate belief is then averaged with the belief of neighbors to form the individuals belief at next time step. We find a set of minimal sufficient conditions under which the agents will learn the unknown state and reach consensus on their beliefs without any assumption on the private signal structure. The key enabler is a result that shows that using this update, agents will eventually forecast the indefinite future correctly.
How users in a dynamic system perform learning and make decision become more and more important in numerous research fields. Although there are some works in the social learning literatures regarding how to construct belief on an uncertain system state, few study has been conducted on incorporating social learning with decision making. Moreover, users may have multiple concurrent decisions on different objects/resources and their decisions usually negatively influence each others utility, which makes the problem even more challenging. In this paper, we propose an Indian Buffet Game to study how users in a dynamic system learn the uncertain system state and make multiple concurrent decisions by not only considering the current myopic utility, but also taking into account the influence of subsequent users decisions. We analyze the proposed Indian Buffet Game under two different scenarios: customers request multiple dishes without budget constraint and with budget constraint. For both cases, we design recursive best response algorithms to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for customers and characterize special properties of the Nash equilibrium profile under homogeneous setting. Moreover, we introduce a non-Bayesian social learning algorithm for customers to learn the system state, and theoretically prove its convergence. Finally, we conduct simulations to validate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed algorithms.
Graph-theoretic methods have seen wide use throughout the literature on multi-agent control and optimization. When communications are intermittent and unpredictable, such networks have been modeled using random communication graphs. When graphs are time-varying, it is common to assume that their unions are connected over time, yet, to the best of our knowledge, there are not results that determine the number of finite-size random graphs needed to attain a connected union. Therefore, this paper bounds the probability that individual random graphs are connected and bounds the same probability for connectedness of unions of random graphs. The random graph model used is a generalization of the classic Erdos-Renyi model which allows some edges never to appear. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the analytical developments made.
Consider a dynamic random geometric social network identified by $s_t$ independent points $x_t^1,ldots,x_t^{s_t}$ in the unit square $[0,1]^2$ that interact in continuous time $tgeq 0$. The generative model of the random points is a Poisson point measures. Each point $x_t^i$ can be active or not in the network with a Bernoulli probability $p$. Each pair being connected by affinity thanks to a step connection function if the interpoint distance $|x_t^i-x_t^j|leq a_mathsf{f}^star$ for any $i eq j$. We prove that when $a_mathsf{f}^star=sqrt{frac{(s_t)^{l-1}}{ppi}}$ for $lin(0,1)$, the number of isolated points is governed by a Poisson approximation as $s_ttoinfty$. This offers a natural threshold for the construction of a $a_mathsf{f}^star$-neighborhood procedure tailored to the dynamic clustering of the network adaptively from the data.
Potential buyers of a product or service tend to read reviews from previous consumers before making their decisions. This behavior is modeled by a market of Bayesian consumers with heterogeneous preferences, who sequentially decide whether to buy an item of unknown quality, based on previous buyers reviews. The quality is multi-dimensional and the reviews can assume one of different forms and can also be multi-dimensional. The belief about the items quality in simple uni-dimensional settings is known to converge to its true value. Our paper extends this result to the more general case of a multidimensional quality, possibly in a continuous space, and provides anytime convergence rates. In practice, the quality of an item may vary over time, due to some change in the production process or the need to keep up with the competition. This paper also studies the learning dynamic when the unknown quality changes at random times and shows that the cost of learning is rather small