اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدLiquidation, Leverage and Optimal Margin in Bitcoin Futures Markets
108
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Using the generalized extreme value theory to characterize tail distributions, we address liquidation, leverage, and optimal margins for bitcoin long and short futures positions. The empirical analysis of perpetual bitcoin futures on BitMEX shows that (1) daily forced liquidations to out- standing futures are substantial at 3.51%, and 1.89% for long and short; (2) investors got forced liquidation do trade aggressively with average leverage of 60X; and (3) exchanges should elevate current 1% margin requirement to 33% (3X leverage) for long and 20% (5X leverage) for short to reduce the daily margin call probability to 1%. Our results further suggest normality assumption on return significantly underestimates optimal margins. Policy implications are also discussed.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
We consider the Brownian market model and the problem of expected utility maximization of terminal wealth. We, specifically, examine the problem of maximizing the utility of terminal wealth under the presence of transaction costs of a fund/agent inve
sting in futures markets. We offer some preliminary remarks about statistical arbitrage strategies and we set the framework for futures markets, and introduce concepts such as margin, gearing and slippage. The setting is of discrete time, and the price evolution of the futures prices is modelled as discrete random sequence involving Itos sums. We assume the drift and the Brownian motion driving the return process are non-observable and the transaction costs are represented by the bid-ask spread. We provide explicit solution to the optimal portfolio process, and we offer an example using logarithmic utility.
In light of micro-scale inefficiencies induced by the high degree of fragmentation of the Bitcoin trading landscape, we utilize a granular data set comprised of orderbook and trades data from the most liquid Bitcoin markets, in order to understand th
e price formation process at sub-1 second time scales. To achieve this goal, we construct a set of features that encapsulate relevant microstructural information over short lookback windows. These features are subsequently leveraged first to generate a leader-lagger network that quantifies how markets impact one another, and then to train linear models capable of explaining between 10% and 37% of total variation in $500$ms future returns (depending on which market is the prediction target). The results are then compared with those of various PnL calculations that take trading realities, such as transaction costs, into account. The PnL calculations are based on natural $textit{taker}$ strategies (meaning they employ market orders) that we associate to each model. Our findings emphasize the role of a markets fee regime in determining its propensity to being a leader or a lagger, as well as the profitability of our taker strategy. Taking our analysis further, we also derive a natural $textit{maker}$ strategy (i.e., one that uses only passive limit orders), which, due to the difficulties associated with backtesting maker strategies, we test in a real-world live trading experiment, in which we turned over 1.5 million USD in notional volume. Lending additional confidence to our models, and by extension to the features they are based on, the results indicate a significant improvement over a naive benchmark strategy, which we also deploy in a live trading environment with real capital, for the sake of comparison.
A consistency criterion for price impact functions in limit order markets is proposed that prohibits chain arbitrage exploitation. Both the bid-ask spread and the feedback of sequential market orders of the same kind onto both sides of the order book
are essential to ensure consistency at the smallest time scale. All the stocks investigated in Paris Stock Exchange have consistent price impact functions.
We analyse high-frequency realised volatility dynamics and spillovers in the bitcoin market, focusing on two pairs: bitcoin against the US dollar (the main fiat-crypto pair) and trading bitcoin against tether (the main crypto-crypto pair). We find th
at the tether-margined perpetual contract on Binance is clearly the main source of volatility, continuously transmitting strong flows to all other instruments and receiving only a little volatility. Moreover, we find that (i) during US trading hours, traders pay more attention and are more reactive to prevailing market conditions when updating their expectations and (ii) the crypto market exhibits a higher interconnectedness when traditional Western stock markets are open. Our results highlight that regulators should not only consider spot exchanges offering bitcoin-fiat trading but also the tether-margined derivatives products available on most unregulated exchanges, most importantly Binance.
We consider trading against a hedge fund or large trader that must liquidate a large position in a risky asset if the market price of the asset crosses a certain threshold. Liquidation occurs in a disorderly manner and negatively impacts the market p
rice of the asset. We consider the perspective of small investors whose trades do not induce market impact and who possess different levels of information about the liquidation trigger mechanism and the market impact. We classify these market participants into three types: fully informed, partially informed and uninformed investors. We consider the portfolio optimization problems and compare the optimal trading and wealth processes for the three classes of investors theoretically and by numerical illustrations.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
