ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions with strong incentive guarantees is a core concern of economic theory. Computational auctions enable online advertising, sourcing, spectrum allocation, and myriad financial markets. Analytic progress in this space is notoriously difficult; since Myersons 1981 work characterizing single-item optimal auctions, there has been limited progress outside of restricted settings. A recent paper by Dutting et al. circumvents analytic difficulties by applying deep learning techniques to, instead, approximate optimal auctions. In parallel, new research from Ilvento et al. and other groups has developed notions of fairness in the context of auction design. Inspired by these advances, in this paper, we extend techniques for approximating auctions using deep learning to address concerns of fairness while maintaining high revenue and strong incentive guarantees.
The design of optimal auctions is a problem of interest in economics, game theory and computer science. Despite decades of effort, strategyproof, revenue-maximizing auction designs are still not known outside of restricted settings. However, recent m
Decision-making systems increasingly orchestrate our world: how to intervene on the algorithmic components to build fair and equitable systems is therefore a question of utmost importance; one that is substantially complicated by the context-dependen
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in the past decades and analytical solutions are known for only a few simple
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that, given samples from the unknown valuation distribution of each bidder, learns an auction that approximately maximizes the auctioneers revenue in a variety of single-parameter auction environments including
This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes th