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تسجيل مستخدم جديدOptimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids
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This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal), prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e., the auction is incentive-compatible), and ensures that buyers will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually-rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism.
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