اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدApproximately Stable, School Optimal, and Student-Truthful Many-to-One Matchings (via Differential Privacy)
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We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings, while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Our main tool in this endeavor is differential privacy: we give an algorithm that coordinates a stable matching using differentially private signals, which lead to our truthfulness guarantee. This is the first setting in which it is known how to achieve nontrivial truthfulness guarantees for students when computing school optimal matchings, assuming worst- case preferences (for schools and students) in large markets.
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