اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدModeling Cultural Dynamics
176
0
0.0
(
0
)
تأليف
Liane Gabora
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
EVOC (for EVOlution of Culture) is a computer model of culture that enables us to investigate how various factors such as barriers to cultural diffusion, the presence and choice of leaders, or changes in the ratio of innovation to imitation affect the diversity and effectiveness of ideas. It consists of neural network based agents that invent ideas for actions, and imitate neighbors actions. The model is based on a theory of culture according to which what evolves through culture is not memes or artifacts, but the internal models of the world that give rise to them, and they evolve not through a Darwinian process of competitive exclusion but a Lamarckian process involving exchange of innovation protocols. EVOC shows an increase in mean fitness of actions over time, and an increase and then decrease in the diversity of actions. Diversity of actions is positively correlated with population size and density, and with barriers between populations. Slowly eroding borders increase fitness without sacrificing diversity by fostering specialization followed by sharing of fit actions. Introducing a leader that broadcasts its actions throughout the population increases the fitness of actions but reduces diversity of actions. Increasing the number of leaders reduces this effect. Efforts are underway to simulate the conditions under which an agent immigrating from one culture to another contributes new ideas while still fitting in.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Human culture is uniquely cumulative and open-ended. Using a computational model of cultural evolution in which neural network based agents evolve ideas for actions through invention and imitation, we tested the hypothesis that this is due to the cap
acity for recursive recall. We compared runs in which agents were limited to single-step actions to runs in which they used recursive recall to chain simple actions into complex ones. Chaining resulted in higher cultural diversity, open-ended generation of novelty, and no ceiling on the mean fitness of actions. Both chaining and no-chaining runs exhibited convergence on optimal actions, but without chaining this set was static while with chaining it was ever-changing. Chaining increased the ability to capitalize on the capacity for learning. These findings show that the recursive recall hypothesis provides a computationally plausible explanation of why humans alone have evolved the cultural means to transform this planet.
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a powerful paradigm to gain insight into social phenomena. One area that ABM has rarely been applied is coalition formation. Traditionally, coalition formation is modeled using cooperative game theory. In this paper, a h
euristic algorithm is developed that can be embedded into an ABM to allow the agents to find coalition. The resultant coalition structures are comparable to those found by cooperative game theory solution approaches, specifically, the core. A heuristic approach is required due to the computational complexity of finding a cooperative game theory solution which limits its application to about only a score of agents. The ABM paradigm provides a platform in which simple rules and interactions between agents can produce a macro-level effect without the large computational requirements. As such, it can be an effective means for approximating cooperative game solutions for large numbers of agents. Our heuristic algorithm combines agent-based modeling and cooperative game theory to help find agent partitions that are members of a games core solution. The accuracy of our heuristic algorithm can be determined by comparing its outcomes to the actual core solutions. This comparison achieved by developing an experiment that uses a specific example of a cooperative game called the glove game. The glove game is a type of exchange economy game. Finding the traditional cooperative game theory solutions is computationally intensive for large numbers of players because each possible partition must be compared to each possible coalition to determine the core set; hence our experiment only considers games of up to nine players. The results indicate that our heuristic approach achieves a core solution over 90% of the time for the games considered in our experiment.
What is the role of real-time control and learning in the formation of social conventions? To answer this question, we propose a computational model that matches human behavioral data in a social decision-making game that was analyzed both in discret
e-time and continuous-time setups. Furthermore, unlike previous approaches, our model takes into account the role of sensorimotor control loops in embodied decision-making scenarios. For this purpose, we introduce the Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) model. CRL is grounded in the Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) theory of mind and brain, where low-level sensorimotor control is modulated through perceptual and behavioral learning in a layered structure. CRL follows these principles by implementing a feedback control loop handling the agents reactive behaviors (pre-wired reflexes), along with an adaptive layer that uses reinforcement learning to maximize long-term reward. We test our model in a multi-agent game-theoretic task in which coordination must be achieved to find an optimal solution. We show that CRL is able to reach human-level performance on standard game-theoretic metrics such as efficiency in acquiring rewards and fairness in reward distribution.
Collective action demands that individuals efficiently coordinate how much, where, and when to cooperate. Laboratory experiments have extensively explored the first part of this process, demonstrating that a variety of social-cognitive mechanisms inf
luence how much individuals choose to invest in group efforts. However, experimental research has been unable to shed light on how social cognitive mechanisms contribute to the where and when of collective action. We leverage multi-agent deep reinforcement learning to model how a social-cognitive mechanism--specifically, the intrinsic motivation to achieve a good reputation--steers group behavior toward specific spatial and temporal strategies for collective action in a social dilemma. We also collect behavioral data from groups of human participants challenged with the same dilemma. The model accurately predicts spatial and temporal patterns of group behavior: in this public goods dilemma, the intrinsic motivation for reputation catalyzes the development of a non-territorial, turn-taking strategy to coordinate collective action.
In the naming game, individuals or agents exchange pairwise local information in order to communicate about objects in their common environment. The goal of the game is to reach a consensus about naming these objects. Originally used to investigate l
anguage formation and self-organizing vocabularies, we extend the classical naming game with a globally shared memory accessible by all agents. This shared memory can be interpreted as an external source of knowledge like a book or an Internet site. The extended naming game models an environment similar to one that can be found in the context of social bookmarking and collaborative tagging sites where users tag sites using appropriate labels, but also mimics an important aspect in the field of human-based image labeling. Although the extended naming game is non-deterministic in its word selection, we show that consensus towards a common vocabulary is reached. More importantly, we show the qualitative and quantitative influence of the external source of information, i.e. the shared memory, on the consensus dynamics between the agents.
الأسئلة المقترحة
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
