اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدFair Compensation
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John E. Stovall
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A firm has a group of workers, each of whom has varying productivities over a set of tasks. After assigning workers to tasks, the firm must then decide how to distribute its output to the workers. We first consider three compensation rules and various fairness properties they may satisfy. We show that among efficient and symmetric rules: the Egalitarian rule is the only rule that is invariant to ``irrelevant changes in one workers productivity; the Individual Contribution rule is the only rule that is invariant to the removal of workers and their assigned tasks; and the Shapley Value rule is the only rule that, for any two workers, equalizes the impact one worker has on the other workers compensation. We introduce other rules and axioms, and relate each rule to each axiom.
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