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تسجيل مستخدم جديدComment on Scheme of the arrangement for attack on the protocol BB84
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In a recent paper (Scheme of the arrangement for attack on the protocol BB84, Optik 127(18):7083-7087, Sept 2016), a protocol was proposed for using weak measurement to attack BB84. This claimed the four basis states typically used could be perfectly discriminated, and so an interceptor could obtain all information carried. We show this attack fails when considered using standard quantum mechanics, as expected - such ``single-shot quantum state discrimination is impossible, even using weak measurement.
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