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تسجيل مستخدم جديدScale-free networks may not necessarily witness cooperation
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Networks with a scale-free degree distribution are widely thought to promote cooperation in various games. Herein, by studying the well-known prisoners dilemma game, we demonstrate that this need not necessarily be true. For the very same degree sequence and degree distribution, we present a variety of possible behaviour. We reassess the perceived importance of hubs in a network towards the maintenance of cooperation. We also reevaluate the dependence of cooperation on network clustering and assortativity.
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