ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Evolutionary game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from science to engineering. Previous studies proposed a strategy updating mechanism, which successfully demonstrated that the scale-free network can provide a framework for the emergence of cooperation. Instead, individuals in random graphs and small-world networks do not favor cooperation under this updating rule. However, a recent empirical result shows the heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper, we propose a strategy updating rule with payoff memory. We observe that the random graphs and small-world networks can provide even better frameworks for cooperation than the scale-free networks in this scenario. Our observations suggest that the degree heterogeneity may be neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition for the widespread cooperation in complex networks. Also, the topological structures are not sufficed to determine the level of cooperation in complex networks.
Networks with a scale-free degree distribution are widely thought to promote cooperation in various games. Herein, by studying the well-known prisoners dilemma game, we demonstrate that this need not necessarily be true. For the very same degree sequ
Despite the structural properties of online social networks have attracted much attention, the properties of the close-knit friendship structures remain an important question. Here, we mainly focus on how these mesoscale structures are affected by th
We give an intuitive though general explanation of the finite-size effect in scale-free networks in terms of the degree distribution of the starting network. This result clarifies the relevance of the starting network in the final degree distribution
We study the evolutionary Prisoners Dilemma on two social networks obtained from actual relational data. We find very different cooperation levels on each of them that can not be easily understood in terms of global statistical properties of both net
By means of extensive computer simulations, the authors consider the entangled coevolution of actions and social structure in a new version of a spatial Prisoners Dilemma model that naturally gives way to a process of social differentiation. Diverse