اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدLight Can Hack Your Face! Black-box Backdoor Attack on Face Recognition Systems
452
0
0.0
(
0
)
تأليف
Haoliang Li
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Deep neural networks (DNN) have shown great success in many computer vision applications. However, they are also known to be susceptible to backdoor attacks. When conducting backdoor attacks, most of the existing approaches assume that the targeted DNN is always available, and an attacker can always inject a specific pattern to the training data to further fine-tune the DNN model. However, in practice, such attack may not be feasible as the DNN model is encrypted and only available to the secure enclave. In this paper, we propose a novel black-box backdoor attack technique on face recognition systems, which can be conducted without the knowledge of the targeted DNN model. To be specific, we propose a backdoor attack with a novel color stripe pattern trigger, which can be generated by modulating LED in a specialized waveform. We also use an evolutionary computing strategy to optimize the waveform for backdoor attack. Our backdoor attack can be conducted in a very mild condition: 1) the adversary cannot manipulate the input in an unnatural way (e.g., injecting adversarial noise); 2) the adversary cannot access the training database; 3) the adversary has no knowledge of the training model as well as the training set used by the victim party. We show that the backdoor trigger can be quite effective, where the attack success rate can be up to $88%$ based on our simulation study and up to $40%$ based on our physical-domain study by considering the task of face recognition and verification based on at most three-time attempts during authentication. Finally, we evaluate several state-of-the-art potential defenses towards backdoor attacks, and find that our attack can still be effective. We highlight that our study revealed a new physical backdoor attack, which calls for the attention of the security issue of the existing face recognition/verification techniques.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Deep learning models are increasingly used in mobile applications as critical components. Unlike the program bytecode whose vulnerabilities and threats have been widely-discussed, whether and how the deep learning models deployed in the applications
can be compromised are not well-understood since neural networks are usually viewed as a black box. In this paper, we introduce a highly practical backdoor attack achieved with a set of reverse-engineering techniques over compiled deep learning models. The core of the attack is a neural conditional branch constructed with a trigger detector and several operators and injected into the victim model as a malicious payload. The attack is effective as the conditional logic can be flexibly customized by the attacker, and scalable as it does not require any prior knowledge from the original model. We evaluated the attack effectiveness using 5 state-of-the-art deep learning models and real-world samples collected from 30 users. The results demonstrated that the injected backdoor can be triggered with a success rate of 93.5%, while only brought less than 2ms latency overhead and no more than 1.4% accuracy decrease. We further conducted an empirical study on real-world mobile deep learning apps collected from Google Play. We found 54 apps that were vulnerable to our attack, including popular and security-critical ones. The results call for the awareness of deep learning application developers and auditors to enhance the protection of deployed models.
Machine learning classifiers are critically prone to evasion attacks. Adversarial examples are slightly modified inputs that are then misclassified, while remaining perceptively close to their originals. Last couple of years have witnessed a striking
decrease in the amount of queries a black box attack submits to the target classifier, in order to forge adversarials. This particularly concerns the black-box score-based setup, where the attacker has access to top predicted probabilites: the amount of queries went from to millions of to less than a thousand. This paper presents SurFree, a geometrical approach that achieves a similar drastic reduction in the amount of queries in the hardest setup: black box decision-based attacks (only the top-1 label is available). We first highlight that the most recent attacks in that setup, HSJA, QEBA and GeoDA all perform costly gradient surrogate estimations. SurFree proposes to bypass these, by instead focusing on careful trials along diverse directions, guided by precise indications of geometrical properties of the classifier decision boundaries. We motivate this geometric approach before performing a head-to-head comparison with previous attacks with the amount of queries as a first class citizen. We exhibit a faster distortion decay under low query amounts (few hundreds to a thousand), while remaining competitive at higher query budgets.
Backdoor attack intends to inject hidden backdoor into the deep neural networks (DNNs), such that the prediction of infected models will be maliciously changed if the hidden backdoor is activated by the attacker-defined trigger. Currently, most exist
ing backdoor attacks adopted the setting of static trigger, $i.e.,$ triggers across the training and testing images follow the same appearance and are located in the same area. In this paper, we revisit this attack paradigm by analyzing trigger characteristics. We demonstrate that this attack paradigm is vulnerable when the trigger in testing images is not consistent with the one used for training. As such, those attacks are far less effective in the physical world, where the location and appearance of the trigger in the digitized image may be different from that of the one used for training. Moreover, we also discuss how to alleviate such vulnerability. We hope that this work could inspire more explorations on backdoor properties, to help the design of more advanced backdoor attack and defense methods.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to the emph{backdoor attack}, which intends to embed hidden backdoors in DNNs by poisoning training data. The attacked model behaves normally on benign samples, whereas its prediction will be changed to a pa
rticular target label if hidden backdoors are activated. So far, backdoor research has mostly been conducted towards classification tasks. In this paper, we reveal that this threat could also happen in semantic segmentation, which may further endanger many mission-critical applications ($e.g.$, autonomous driving). Except for extending the existing attack paradigm to maliciously manipulate the segmentation models from the image-level, we propose a novel attack paradigm, the emph{fine-grained attack}, where we treat the target label ($i.e.$, annotation) from the object-level instead of the image-level to achieve more sophisticated manipulation. In the annotation of poisoned samples generated by the fine-grained attack, only pixels of specific objects will be labeled with the attacker-specified target class while others are still with their ground-truth ones. Experiments show that the proposed methods can successfully attack semantic segmentation models by poisoning only a small proportion of training data. Our method not only provides a new perspective for designing novel attacks but also serves as a strong baseline for improving the robustness of semantic segmentation methods.
Face authentication is now widely used, especially on mobile devices, rather than authentication using a personal identification number or an unlock pattern, due to its convenience. It has thus become a tempting target for attackers using a presentat
ion attack. Traditional presentation attacks use facial images or videos of the victim. Previous work has proven the existence of master faces, i.e., faces that match multiple enrolled templates in face recognition systems, and their existence extends the ability of presentation attacks. In this paper, we perform an extensive study on latent variable evolution (LVE), a method commonly used to generate master faces. We run an LVE algorithm for various scenarios and with more than one database and/or face recognition system to study the properties of the master faces and to understand in which conditions strong master faces could be generated. Moreover, through analysis, we hypothesize that master faces come from some dense areas in the embedding spaces of the face recognition systems. Last but not least, simulated presentation attacks using generated master faces generally preserve the false-matching ability of their original digital forms, thus demonstrating that the existence of master faces poses an actual threat.
الأسئلة المقترحة
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
