اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدPopulation dynamics and control with imposed interbirth refractory periods
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We consider age-structured models with an imposed refractory period between births. These models can be used to formulate alternative population control strategies to Chinas one-child policy. By allowing any number of births, but with an imposed delay between births, we show how the total population can be decreased and how a relatively younger age distribution generated. This delay represents a more continuous form of population management for which the one-child policy is a limiting case. Such a policy approach could be more easily accepted by society. We also propose alternative birth rate functions that might result from a societal response to imposed refractory periods. Our numerical and asymptotic analyses provides an initial framework for studying demographics and how social dynamics influences population structure.
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