اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدPopulation dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium
79
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Population dynamics of a competitive two-species system under the influence of random events are analyzed and expressions for the steady-state population mean, fluctuations, and cross-correlation of the two species are presented. It is shown that ran
dom events cause the population mean of each specie to make smooth transition from far above to far below of its growth rate threshold. At the same time, the population mean of the weaker specie never reaches the extinction point. It is also shown that, as a result of competition, the relative population fluctuations do not die out as the growth rates of both species are raised far above their respective thresholds. This behavior is most remarkable at the maximum competition point where the weaker species population statistics becomes completely chaotic regardless of how far its growth rate in raised.
We consider age-structured models with an imposed refractory period between births. These models can be used to formulate alternative population control strategies to Chinas one-child policy. By allowing any number of births, but with an imposed dela
y between births, we show how the total population can be decreased and how a relatively younger age distribution generated. This delay represents a more continuous form of population management for which the one-child policy is a limiting case. Such a policy approach could be more easily accepted by society. We also propose alternative birth rate functions that might result from a societal response to imposed refractory periods. Our numerical and asymptotic analyses provides an initial framework for studying demographics and how social dynamics influences population structure.
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts of evoluti
onary game theory and review basic properties of deterministic replicator dynamics and stochastic dynamics of finite populations. We discuss stability of equilibria in deterministic dynamics with migration, time-delay, and in stochastic dynamics of well-mixed populations and spatial games with local interactions. We analyze the dependence of the long-run behaviour of a population on various parameters such as the time delay, the noise level, and the size of the population.
Environmental changes greatly influence the evolution of populations. Here, we study the dynamics of a population of two strains, one growing slightly faster than the other, competing for resources in a time-varying binary environment modeled by a ca
rrying capacity switching either randomly or periodically between states of abundance and scarcity. The population dynamics is characterized by demographic noise (birth and death events) coupled to a varying environment. We elucidate the similarities and differences of the evolution subject to a stochastically- and periodically-varying environment. Importantly, the population size distribution is generally found to be broader under intermediate and fast random switching than under periodic variations, which results in markedly different asymptotic behaviors between the fixation probability of random and periodic switching. We also determine the detailed conditions under which the fixation probability of the slow strain is maximal.
In addition to their unusually long life cycle, periodical cicadas, {it Magicicada} spp., provide an exceptional example of spatially synchronized life stage phenology in nature. Within regions (broods) spanning 50,000 to 500,000 km$^2$, adults emerg
e synchronously every 13 or 17 years. While satiation of avian predators is believed to be a key component of the ability of these populations to reach high densities, it is not clear why populations at a single location remain entirely synchronized. We develop nonlinear Leslie matrix-type models of periodical cicadas that include predation-driven Allee effects and competition in addition to reproduction and survival. Using both analytical and numerical techniques, we demonstrate the observed presence of a single brood critically depends on the relationship between fecundity, competition, and predation. We analyze the single-brood, two-brood and all-brood equilibria in the large life-span limit using a tractable hybrid approximation to the Leslie matrix model with continuous time competition in between discrete reproduction events. Within the hybrid model we prove that the single-brood equilibrium is the only stable equilibrium. This hybrid model allows us to quantitatively predict population sizes and the range of parameters for which the stable single-brood and unstable two-brood and all-brood equilibria exist. The hybrid model yields a good approximation to the numerical results for the Leslie matrix model for the biologically relevant case of a 17-year lifespan.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
