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تسجيل مستخدم جديدA Canon of Probabilistic Rationality
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We prove that a random choice rule satisfies Luces Choice Axiom if and only if its support is a choice correspondence that satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, thus it consists of alternatives that are optimal according to some preference, and random choice then occurs according to a tie breaking among such alternatives that satisfies Renyis Conditioning Axiom. Our result shows that the Choice Axiom is, in a precise formal sense, a probabilistic version of the Weak Axiom. It thus supports Luces view of his own axiom as a canon of probabilistic rationality.
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