اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدThe probabilistic rank random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
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This paper considers the problem of randomly assigning a set of objects to a set of agents based on the ordinal preferences of agents. We generalize the well-known immediate acceptance algorithm to the afore-mentioned random environments and define the probabilistic rank rule (PR rule). We introduce two new axioms: sd-rank-fairness, and equal-rank envy-freeness. Sd-rank-fairness implies sd-efficiency. Equal-rank envy-freeness implies equal treatment of equals. Sd-rank-fairness and equal-rank envy-freeness are enough to characterize the PR rule.
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