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تسجيل مستخدم جديدBlacklight: Defending Black-Box Adversarial Attacks on Deep Neural Networks
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The vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs) to adversarial examples is well documented. Under the strong white-box threat model, where attackers have full access to DNN internals, recent work has produced continual advancements in defenses, often followed by more powerful attacks that break them. Meanwhile, research on the more realistic black-box threat model has focused almost entirely on reducing the query-cost of attacks, making them increasingly practical for ML models already deployed today. This paper proposes and evaluates Blacklight, a new defense against black-box adversarial attacks. Blacklight targets a key property of black-box attacks: to compute adversarial examples, they produce sequences of highly similar images while trying to minimize the distance from some initial benign input. To detect an attack, Blacklight computes for each query image a compact set of one-way hash values that form a probabilistic fingerprint. Variants of an image produce nearly identical fingerprints, and fingerprint generation is robust against manipulation. We evaluate Blacklight on 5 state-of-the-art black-box attacks, across a variety of models and classification tasks. While the most efficient attacks take thousands or tens of thousands of queries to complete, Blacklight identifies them all, often after only a handful of queries. Blacklight is also robust against several powerful countermeasures, including an optimal black-box attack that approximates white-box attacks in efficiency. Finally, Blacklight significantly outperforms the only known alternative in both detection coverage of attack queries and resistance against persistent attackers.
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