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Combinatorial Game Theory (CGT) is a branch of game theory that has developed almost independently from Economic Game Theory (EGT), and is concerned with deep mathematical properties of 2-player 0-sum games that are defined over various combinatorial structures. The aim of this work is to lay foundations to bridging the conceptual and technical gaps between CGT and EGT, here interpreted as so-called Extensive Form Games, so they can be treated within a unified framework. More specifically, we introduce a class of $n$-player, general-sum games, called Cumulative Games, that can be analyzed by both CGT and EGT tools. We show how two of the most fundamental definitions of CGT---the outcome function, and the disjunctive sum operator---naturally extend to the class of Cumulative Games. The outcome function allows for an efficient equilibrium computation under certain restrictions, and the disjunctive sum operator lets us define a partial order over games, according to the advantage that a certain player has. Finally, we show that any Extensive Form Game can be written as a Cumulative Game.
We study the computational complexity of the Buttons & Scissors game and obtain sharp thresholds with respect to several parameters. Specifically we show that the game is NP-complete for $C = 2$ colors but polytime solvable for $C = 1$. Similarly the
In this paper we introduce novel algorithmic strategies for effciently playing two-player games in which the players have different or identical player roles. In the case of identical roles, the players compete for the same objective (that of winning
Zero-sum games have long guided artificial intelligence research, since they possess both a rich strategy space of best-responses and a clear evaluation metric. Whats more, competition is a vital mechanism in many real-world multi-agent systems capab
Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we propose an
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of them acts