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تسجيل مستخدم جديدEfficient Online Algorithmic Strategies for Several Two-Player Games with Different or Identical Player Roles
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نشر من قبل
Mugurel Ionut Andreica
تاريخ النشر
2013
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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In this paper we introduce novel algorithmic strategies for effciently playing two-player games in which the players have different or identical player roles. In the case of identical roles, the players compete for the same objective (that of winning the game). The case with different player roles assumes that one of the players asks questions in order to identify a secret pattern and the other one answers them. The purpose of the first player is to ask as few questions as possible (or that the questions and their number satisfy some previously known constraints) and the purpose of the secret player is to answer the questions in a way that will maximize the number of questions asked by the first player (or in a way which forces the first player to break the constraints of the game). We consider both previously known games (or extensions of theirs) and new types of games, introduced in this paper.
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