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Comment on Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]

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 نشر من قبل Vadim Makarov
 تاريخ النشر 2018
  مجال البحث فيزياء
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This is a brief comment on the Letter by Balygin and his coworkers [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]. We point out an error that invalidates the Letters conclusions.



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