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Modern single-photon detectors based on avalanche photodiodes offer increasingly higher triggering speeds, thus fostering their use in several fields, prominently in the recent area of Quantum Key Distribution. To reduce the probability of an afterpulse, these detectors are usually equipped with a circuitry that disables the trigger for a certain time after a positive detection event, known as dead time. If the acquisition system connected to the detector is not properly designed, efficiency issues arise when the triggering rate is faster than the inverse of detectors dead-time. Moreover, when this happens with two or more detectors used in coincidence, a security risk called self-blinding can jeopardize the distribution of a secret quantum key. In this paper we introduce a trigger-disabling circuitry based on an FPGA-driven feedback loop, so to avoid the above-mentioned inconveniences. In the regime of single-photon-attenuated light, the electronics dynamically accept a trigger only after detectors complete recovery from dead-time. This technique proves useful to work with detectors at their maximum speed and to increase the security of a quantum key distribution setup.
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the quantum stat
In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully launched
The work by Christandl, Konig and Renner [Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 020504 (2009)] provides in particular the possibility of studying unconditional security in the finite-key regime for all discrete-variable protocols. We spell out this bound from their
The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties, thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, conventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks pose natu
This is a brief comment on the Letter by Balygin and his coworkers [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]. We point out an error that invalidates the Letters conclusions.