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In a two-way deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol, Bob randomly prepares qubits in one of four states and sends them to Alice. To encode a bit, Alice performs an operation on each received qubit and returns it to Bob. Bob then measures the backward qubits to learn about Alices operations and hence the key bits. Recently, we proved the unconditional security of the final key of this protocol in the ideal device setting. In this paper, we prove that two-way DQKD protocols are immune to all detector side channel attacks at Bobs side, while we assume ideal detectors at Alices side for error testing. Our result represents a step forward in making DQKD protocols secure against general detector side channel attacks.
Quantum key distribution can provide unconditionally secure key exchange for remote users in theory. In practice, however, in most quantum key distribution systems, quantum hackers might steal the secure keys by listening to the side channels in the
The work by Christandl, Konig and Renner [Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 020504 (2009)] provides in particular the possibility of studying unconditional security in the finite-key regime for all discrete-variable protocols. We spell out this bound from their
Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that the behaviour of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modelled and predicted. Remarkably, no assumptio
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the quantum stat
We investigate the performance of Gaussianmodulated coherent-state QKD protocols in the presence of canonical attacks, which are collective Gaussian attacks resulting in Gaussian channels described by one of the possible canonical forms. We present a