اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدAnatomy of an online misinformation network
87
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Massive amounts of fake news and conspiratorial content have spread over social media before and after the 2016 US Presidential Elections despite intense fact-checking efforts. How do the spread of misinformation and fact-checking compete? What are the structural and dynamic characteristics of the core of the misinformation diffusion network, and who are its main purveyors? How to reduce the overall amount of misinformation? To explore these questions we built Hoaxy, an open platform that enables large-scale, systematic studies of how misinformation and fact-checking spread and compete on Twitter. Hoaxy filters public tweets that include links to unverified claims or fact-checking articles. We perform k-core decomposition on a diffusion network obtained from two million retweets produced by several hundred thousand accounts over the six months before the election. As we move from the periphery to the core of the network, fact-checking nearly disappears, while social bots proliferate. The number of users in the main core reaches equilibrium around the time of the election, with limited churn and increasingly dense connections. We conclude by quantifying how effectively the network can be disrupted by penalizing the most central nodes. These findings provide a first look at the anatomy of a massive online misinformation diffusion network.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Massive amounts of misinformation have been observed to spread in uncontrolled fashion across social media. Examples include rumors, hoaxes, fake news, and conspiracy theories. At the same time, several journalistic organizations devote significant e
fforts to high-quality fact checking of online claims. The resulting information cascades contain instances of both accurate and inaccurate information, unfold over multiple time scales, and often reach audiences of considerable size. All these factors pose challenges for the study of the social dynamics of online news sharing. Here we introduce Hoaxy, a platform for the collection, detection, and analysis of online misinformation and its related fact-checking efforts. We discuss the design of the platform and present a preliminary analysis of a sample of public tweets containing both fake news and fact checking. We find that, in the aggregate, the sharing of fact-checking content typically lags that of misinformation by 10--20 hours. Moreover, fake news are dominated by very active users, while fact checking is a more grass-roots activity. With the increasing risks connected to massive online misinformation, social news observatories have the potential to help researchers, journalists, and the general public understand the dynamics of real and fake news sharing.
The global COVID-19 pandemic has led to the online proliferation of health-, political-, and conspiratorial-based misinformation. Understanding the reach and belief in this misinformation is vital to managing this crisis, as well as future crises. Th
e results from our global survey finds a troubling reach of and belief in COVID-related misinformation, as well as a correlation with those that primarily consume news from social media, and, in the United States, a strong correlation with political leaning.
Online social networks represent a popular and diverse class of social media systems. Despite this variety, each of these systems undergoes a general process of online social network assembly, which represents the complicated and heterogeneous change
s that transform newly born systems into mature platforms. However, little is known about this process. For example, how much of a networks assembly is driven by simple growth? How does a networks structure change as it matures? How does network structure vary with adoption rates and user heterogeneity, and do these properties play different roles at different points in the assembly? We investigate these and other questions using a unique dataset of online connections among the roughly one million users at the first 100 colleges admitted to Facebook, captured just 20 months after its launch. We first show that different vintages and adoption rates across this population of networks reveal temporal dynamics of the assembly process, and that assembly is only loosely related to network growth. We then exploit natural experiments embedded in this dataset and complementary data obtained via Internet archaeology to show that different subnetworks matured at different rates toward similar end states. These results shed light on the processes and patterns of online social network assembly, and may facilitate more effective design for online social systems.
Online debates are often characterised by extreme polarisation and heated discussions among users. The presence of hate speech online is becoming increasingly problematic, making necessary the development of appropriate countermeasures. In this work,
we perform hate speech detection on a corpus of more than one million comments on YouTube videos through a machine learning model fine-tuned on a large set of hand-annotated data. Our analysis shows that there is no evidence of the presence of serial haters, intended as active users posting exclusively hateful comments. Moreover, coherently with the echo chamber hypothesis, we find that users skewed towards one of the two categories of video channels (questionable, reliable) are more prone to use inappropriate, violent, or hateful language within their opponents community. Interestingly, users loyal to reliable sources use on average a more toxic language than their counterpart. Finally, we find that the overall toxicity of the discussion increases with its length, measured both in terms of number of comments and time. Our results show that, coherently with Godwins law, online debates tend to degenerate towards increasingly toxic exchanges of views.
Humans interact through numerous channels to build and maintain social connections: they meet face-to-face, initiate phone calls or send text messages, and interact via social media. Although it is known that the network of physical contacts, for exa
mple, is distinct from the network arising from communication events via phone calls and instant messages, the extent to which these networks differ is not clear. In fact, the network structure of these channels shows large structural variations. Each network of interactions, however, contains both central and peripheral individuals: central members are characterized by higher connectivity and can reach a high fraction of the network within a low number of connections, contrary to the nodes on the periphery. Here we show that the various channels account for diverse relationships between pairs of individuals and the corresponding interaction patterns across channels differ to an extent that hinders the simple reduction of social ties to a single layer. Furthemore, the origin and purpose of each network also determine the role of their respective central members: highly connected individuals in the person-to-person networks interact with their environment in a regular manner, while members central in the social communication networks display irregular behavior with respect to their physical contacts and are more active through rare, social events. These results suggest that due to the inherently different functions of communication channels, each one favors different social behaviors and different strategies for interacting with the environment. Our findings can facilitate the understanding of the varying roles and impact individuals have on the population, which can further shed light on the prediction and prevention of epidemic outbreaks, or information propagation.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
