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Ensembles of decision trees perform well on many problems, but are not interpretable. In contrast to existing approaches in interpretability that focus on explaining relationships between features and predictions, we propose an alternative approach to interpret tree ensemble classifiers by surfacing representative points for each class -- prototypes. We introduce a new distance for Gradient Boosted Tree models, and propose new, adaptive prototype selection methods with theoretical guarantees, with the flexibility to choose a different number of prototypes in each class. We demonstrate our methods on random forests and gradient boosted trees, showing that the prototypes can perform as well as or even better than the original tree ensemble when used as a nearest-prototype classifier. In a user study, humans were better at predicting the output of a tree ensemble classifier when using prototypes than when using Shapley values, a popular feature attribution method. Hence, prototypes present a viable alternative to feature-based explanations for tree ensembles.
Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (GBDT) are popular machine learning algorithms with implementations such as LightGBM and in popular machine learning toolkits like Scikit-Learn. Many implementations can only produce trees in an offline manner and in a
This paper develops a novel stochastic tree ensemble method for nonlinear regression, which we refer to as XBART, short for Accelerated Bayesian Additive Regression Trees. By combining regularization and stochastic search strategies from Bayesian mod
Interpretable surrogates of black-box predictors trained on high-dimensional tabular datasets can struggle to generate comprehensible explanations in the presence of correlated variables. We propose a model-agnostic interpretable surrogate that provi
Decision trees are a popular technique in statistical data classification. They recursively partition the feature space into disjoint sub-regions until each sub-region becomes homogeneous with respect to a particular class. The basic Classification a
There are various costs for attackers to manipulate the features of security classifiers. The costs are asymmetric across features and to the directions of changes, which cannot be precisely captured by existing cost models based on $L_p$-norm robust