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We address the problem of how the survival of cooperation in a social system depends on the motion of the individuals. Specifically, we study a model in which Prisoners Dilemma players are allowed to move in a two-dimensional plane. Our results show that cooperation can survive in such a system provided that both the temptation to defect and the velocity at which agents move are not too high. Moreover, we show that when these conditions are fulfilled, the only asymptotic state of the system is that in which all players are cooperators. Our results might have implications for the design of cooperative strategies in motion coordination and other applications including wireless networks.
The conventional wisdom is that scale-free networks are prone to cooperation spreading. In this paper we investigate the cooperative behaviors on the structured scale-free network. On the contrary of the conventional wisdom that scale-free networks a
The paradox of cooperation among selfish individuals still puzzles scientific communities. Although a large amount of evidence has demonstrated that cooperator clusters in spatial games are effective to protect cooperators against the invasion of def
In real world, individual rationality varies for the sake of the diversity of peoples individuality. In order to investigate how diversity of agents rationality affects the evolution of cooperation, we introduce the individual rationality proportiona
During the last few years, much research has been devoted to strategic interactions on complex networks. In this context, the Prisoners Dilemma has become a paradigmatic model, and it has been established that imitative evolutionary dynamics lead to
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoners dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or asynchronous) an