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In real world, individual rationality varies for the sake of the diversity of peoples individuality. In order to investigate how diversity of agents rationality affects the evolution of cooperation, we introduce the individual rationality proportional to the $beta$th power of the each agents degree. Simulation results on heterogeneous scale-free network show that the dynamic process is greatly affected by the diversity of rationality. Both promotion and inhibition of cooperative behavior can be observed at different region of parameter $beta$. We present explanation to these results by quantitative and qualitative analysis. The nodes with middle degree value are found to play a critical role in the evolutionary processes. The inspiration from our work may provide us a deeper comprehension towards some social phenomenon.
The paradox of cooperation among selfish individuals still puzzles scientific communities. Although a large amount of evidence has demonstrated that cooperator clusters in spatial games are effective to protect cooperators against the invasion of def
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoners dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower than the inte
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoners dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or asynchronous) an
We study an evolutionary prisoners dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy adoption (learnin
In the evolutionary Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but, instead, inter