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تسجيل مستخدم جديدPrisoners dilemma in structured scale-free networks
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The conventional wisdom is that scale-free networks are prone to cooperation spreading. In this paper we investigate the cooperative behaviors on the structured scale-free network. On the contrary of the conventional wisdom that scale-free networks are prone to cooperation spreading, the evolution of cooperation is inhibited on the structured scale-free network while performing the prisoners dilemma (PD) game. Firstly, we demonstrate that neither the scale-free property nor the high clustering coefficient is responsible for the inhibition of cooperation spreading on the structured scale-free network. Then we provide one heuristic method to argue that the lack of age correlations and its associated `large-world behavior in the structured scale-free network inhibit the spread of cooperation. The findings may help enlighten further studies on evolutionary dynamics of the PD game in scale-free networks.
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