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تسجيل مستخدم جديدYoungs axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof
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Mikl\\'os Pint\\'er
تاريخ النشر
2012
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
تأليف
M. Pinter
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We consider Young (1985)s characterization of the Shapley value, and give a new proof of this axiomatization. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young (1985)s axiomatization of the Shapley value works on various well-known subclasses of TU games.
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