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تسجيل مستخدم جديدSecurity Analyses of One-time System
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Yong Wang
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Computer networks are undergoing a phenomenal growth, driven by the rapidly increasing number of nodes constituting the networks. At the same time, the number of security threats on Internet and intranet networks is constantly growing, and the testin
g and experimentation of cyber defense solutions requires the availability of separate, test environments that best emulate the complexity of a real system. Such environments support the deployment and monitoring of complex mission-driven network scenarios, thus enabling the study of cyber defense strategies under real and controllable traffic and attack scenarios. In this paper, we propose a methodology that makes use of a combination of techniques of network and security assessment, and the use of cloud technologies to build an emulation environment with adjustable degree of affinity with respect to actual reference networks or planned systems. As a byproduct, starting from a specific study case, we collected a dataset consisting of complete network traces comprising benign and malicious traffic, which is feature-rich and publicly available.
With the emerging of touch-less human-computer interaction techniques and gadgets, mid-air hand gestures have been widely used for authentication. Much literature examined either the usability or security of a handful of gestures. This paper aims at
quantifying usability and security of gestures as well as understanding their relationship across multiple gestures. To study gesture-based authentication, we design an authentication method that combines Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) and Support Vector Machine (SVM), and conducted a user study with 42 participants over a period of 6 weeks. We objectively quantify the usability of a gesture by the number of corners and the frame length of all gesture samples, quantify the security using the equal error rate (EER), and the consistency by EER over a period of time. Meanwhile, we obtain subjective evaluation of usability and security by conducting a survey. By examining the responses, we found that the subjective evaluation confirms with the objective ones, and usability is in inverse relationship with security. We studied the consistency of gestures and found that most participants forgot gestures to some degree and reinforcing the memorization of gestures is necessary to improve the authentication performance. Finally, we performed a study with another 17 participants on shoulder surfing attacks, where attackers can observe the victims multiple times. The results show that shoulder surfing does not help to boost the attacks.
With the increasing usage of open-source software (OSS) components, vulnerabilities embedded within them are propagated to a huge number of underlying applications. In practice, the timely application of security patches in downstream software is cha
llenging. The main reason is that such patches do not explicitly indicate their security impacts in the documentation, which would be difficult to recognize for software maintainers and users. However, attackers can still identify these secret security patches by analyzing the source code and generate corresponding exploits to compromise not only unpatch
To defeat security threats such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) 4.2 and 5.x introduce the Secure Connections Only mode, under which a BLE device accepts only secure paring protocols including Passkey Entry and Numeric
Comparison from an initiator, e.g., an Android mobile. However, the BLE specification does not explicitly require the Secure Connection Only mode of the initiator. Taking the Androids BLE programming framework for example, we found that it cannot enforce secure pairing, invalidating the security protection provided by the Secure Connection Only mode. The same problem applies to Apple iOS too. Specifically, we examine the life cycle of a BLE pairing process in Android and identify four severe design flaws. These design flaws can be exploited by attackers to perform downgrading attacks, forcing the BLE pairing protocols to run in the insecure mode without the users awareness. To validate our findings, we selected and tested 18 popular BLE commercial products and our experimental results proved that downgrading attacks and MITM attacks were all possible to these products. All 3501 BLE apps from Androzoo are also subject to these attacks. For defense, we have designed and implemented a prototype of the Secure Connection Only mode on Android 8 through the Android Open Source Project (AOSP). We have reported the identified BLE pairing vulnerabilities to Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), Google, Apple, Texas Instruments (TI) and all of them are actively addressing this issue. Google rated the reported security flaw a High Severity.
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