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تسجيل مستخدم جديدInfinite dimensional differential games with hybrid controls
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A two-person zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game of infinite duration with discounted payoff involving hybrid controls is studied. The minimizing player is allowed to take continuous, switching and impulse controls whereas the maximizing player is allowed to take continuous and switching controls. By taking strategies in the sense of Elliott--Kalton, we prove the existence of value and characterize it as the unique viscosity solution of the associated system of quasi-variational inequalities.
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