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تسجيل مستخدم جديدA Lagrangian approach for aggregative mean field games of controls with mixed and final constraints
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تأليف
Joseph Frederic Bonnans
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The objective of this paper is to analyze the existence of equilibria for a class of deterministic mean field games of controls. The interaction between players is due to both a congestion term and a price function which depends on the distributions of the optimal strategies. Moreover, final state and mixed state-control constraints are considered, the dynamics being nonlinear and affine with respect to the control. The existence of equilibria is obtained by Kakutanis theorem, applied to a fixed point formulation of the problem. Finally, uniqueness results are shown under monotonicity assumptions.
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