Analyzing a large data set of publications drawn from the most competitive journals in the natural and social sciences we show that research careers exhibit the broad distributions of individual achievement characteristic of systems in which cumulati
ve advantage plays a key role. While most researchers are personally aware of the competition implicit in the publication process, little is known about the levels of inequality at the level of individual researchers. We analyzed both productivity and impact measures for a large set of researchers publishing in high-impact journals. For each researcher cohort we calculated Gini inequality coefficients, with average Gini values around 0.48 for total publications and 0.73 for total citations. For perspective, these observed values are well in excess of the inequality levels observed for personal income in developing countries. Investigating possible sources of this inequality, we identify two potential mechanisms that act at the level of the individual that may play defining roles in the emergence of the broad productivity and impact distributions found in science. First, we show that the average time interval between a researchers successive publications in top journals decreases with each subsequent publication. Second, after controlling for the time dependent features of citation distributions, we compare the citation impact of subsequent publications within a researchers publication record. We find that as researchers continue to publish in top journals, there is more likely to be a decreasing trend in the relative citation impact with each subsequent publication. This pattern highlights the difficulty of repeatedly publishing high-impact research and the intriguing possibility that confirmation bias plays a role in the evaluation of scientific careers.
The gradual crowding out of singleton and small team science by large team endeavors is challenging key features of research culture. It is therefore important for the future of scientific practice to reflect upon the individual scientists ethical re
sponsibilities within teams. To facilitate this reflection we show labor force trends in the US revealing a skewed growth in academic ranks and increased levels of competition for promotion within the system; we analyze teaming trends across disciplines and national borders demonstrating why it is becoming difficult to distribute credit and to avoid conflicts of interest; and we use more than a century of Nobel prize data to show how science is outgrowing its old institutions of singleton awards. Of particular concern within the large team environment is the weakening of the mentor-mentee relation, which undermines the cultivation of virtue ethics across scientific generations. These trends and emerging organizational complexities call for a universal set of behavioral norms that transcend team heterogeneity and hierarchy. To this end, our expository analysis provides a survey of ethical issues in team settings to inform science ethics education and science policy.
We present a simple generalization of Hirschs h-index, Z = sqrt{h^{2}+C}/sqrt{5}, where C is the total number of citations. Z is aimed at correcting the potentially excessive penalty made by h on a scientists highly cited papers, because for the majo
rity of scientists analyzed, we find the excess citation fraction (C-h^{2})/C to be distributed closely around the value 0.75, meaning that 75 percent of the authors impact is neglected. Additionally, Z is less sensitive to local changes in a scientists citation profile, namely perturbations which increase h while only marginally affecting C. Using real career data for 476 physicists careers and 488 biologist careers, we analyze both the distribution of $Z$ and the rank stability of Z with respect to the Hirsch index h and the Egghe index g. We analyze careers distributed across a wide range of total impact, including top-cited physicists and biologists for benchmark comparison. In practice, the Z-index requires the same information needed to calculate h and could be effortlessly incorporated within career profile databases, such as Google Scholar and ResearcherID. Because Z incorporates information from the entire publication profile while being more robust than h and g to local perturbations, we argue that Z is better suited for ranking comparisons in academic decision-making scenarios comprising a large number of scientists.
We stress-test the career predictability model proposed by Acuna et al. [Nature 489, 201-202 2012] by applying their model to a longitudinal career data set of 100 Assistant professors in physics, two from each of the top 50 physics departments in th
e US. The Acuna model claims to predict h(t+Delta t), a scientists h-index Delta t years into the future, using a linear combination of 5 cumulative career measures taken at career age t. Here we investigate how the predictability depends on the aggregation of career data across multiple age cohorts. We confirm that the Acuna model does a respectable job of predicting h(t+Delta t) up to roughly 6 years into the future when aggregating all age cohorts together. However, when calculated using subsets of specific age cohorts (e.g. using data for only t=3), we find that the models predictive power significantly decreases, especially when applied to early career years. For young careers, the model does a much worse job of predicting future impact, and hence, exposes a serious limitation. The limitation is particularly concerning as early career decisions make up a significant portion, if not the majority, of cases where quantitative approaches are likely to be applied.
Reputation is an important social construct in science, which enables informed quality assessments of both publications and careers of scientists in the absence of complete systemic information. However, the relation between reputation and career gro
wth of an individual remains poorly understood, despite recent proliferation of quantitative research evaluation methods. Here we develop an original framework for measuring how a publications citation rate $Delta c$ depends on the reputation of its central author $i$, in addition to its net citation count $c$. To estimate the strength of the reputation effect, we perform a longitudinal analysis on the careers of 450 highly-cited scientists, using the total citations $C_{i}$ of each scientist as his/her reputation measure. We find a citation crossover $c_{times}$ which distinguishes the strength of the reputation effect. For publications with $c < c_{times}$, the authors reputation is found to dominate the annual citation rate. Hence, a new publication may gain a significant early advantage corresponding to roughly a 66% increase in the citation rate for each tenfold increase in $C_{i}$. However, the reputation effect becomes negligible for highly cited publications meaning that for $cgeq c_{times}$ the citation rate measures scientific impact more transparently. In addition we have developed a stochastic reputation model, which is found to reproduce numerous statistical observations for real careers, thus providing insight into the microscopic mechanisms underlying cumulative advantage in science.
The Matthew effect refers to the adage written some two-thousand years ago in the Gospel of St. Matthew: For to all those who have, more will be given. Even two millennia later, this idiom is used by sociologists to qualitatively describe the dynamic
s of individual progress and the interplay between status and reward. Quantitative studies of professional careers are traditionally limited by the difficulty in measuring progress and the lack of data on individual careers. However, in some professions, there are well-defined metrics that quantify career longevity, success, and prowess, which together contribute to the overall success rating for an individual employee. Here we demonstrate testable evidence of the age-old Matthew rich get richer effect, wherein the longevity and past success of an individual lead to a cumulative advantage in further developing his/her career. We develop an exactly solvable stochastic career progress model that quantitatively incorporates the Matthew effect, and validate our model predictions for several competitive professions. We test our model on the careers of 400,000 scientists using data from six high-impact journals, and further confirm our findings by testing the model on the careers of more than 20,000 athletes in four sports leagues. Our model highlights the importance of early career development, showing that many careers are stunted by the relative disadvantage associated with inexperience.
We study the cascading dynamics immediately before and immediately after 219 market shocks. We define the time of a market shock T_{c} to be the time for which the market volatility V(T_{c}) has a peak that exceeds a predetermined threshold. The casc
ade of high volatility aftershocks triggered by the main shock is quantitatively similar to earthquakes and solar flares, which have been described by three empirical laws --- the Omori law, the productivity law, and the Bath law. We analyze the most traded 531 stocks in U.S. markets during the two-year period 2001-2002 at the 1-minute time resolution. We find quantitative relations between (i) the main shock magnitude M equiv log V(T_{c}) occurring at the time T_{c} of each of the 219 volatility quakes analyzed, and (ii) the parameters quantifying the decay of volatility aftershocks as well as the volatility preshocks. We also find that stocks with larger trading activity react more strongly and more quickly to market shocks than stocks with smaller trading activity. Our findings characterize the typical volatility response conditional on M, both at the market and the individual stock scale. We argue that there is potential utility in these three statistical quantitative relations with applications in option pricing and volatility trading.
There is a long standing debate over how to objectively compare the career achievements of professional athletes from different historical eras. Developing an objective approach will be of particular importance over the next decade as Major League Ba
seball (MLB) players from the steroids era become eligible for Hall of Fame induction. Here we address this issue, as well as the general problem of comparing statistics from distinct eras, by detrending the seasonal statistics of professional baseball players. We detrend player statistics by normalizing achievements to seasonal averages, which accounts for changes in relative player ability resulting from both exogenous and endogenous factors, such as talent dilution from expansion, equipment and training improvements, as well as performance enhancing drugs (PED). In this paper we compare the probability density function (pdf) of detrended career statistics to the pdf of raw career statistics for five statistical categories -- hits (H), home runs (HR), runs batted in (RBI), wins (W) and strikeouts (K) -- over the 90-year period 1920-2009. We find that the functional form of these pdfs are stationary under detrending. This stationarity implies that the statistical regularity observed in the right-skewed distributions for longevity and success in professional baseball arises from both the wide range of intrinsic talent among athletes and the underlying nature of competition. Using this simple detrending technique, we examine the top 50 all-time careers for H, HR, RBI, W and K. We fit the pdfs for career success by the Gamma distribution in order to calculate objective benchmarks based on extreme statistics which can be used for the identification of extraordinary careers.
Publication statistics are ubiquitous in the ratings of scientific achievement, with citation counts and paper tallies factoring into an individuals consideration for postdoctoral positions, junior faculty, tenure, and even visa status for internatio
nal scientists. Citation statistics are designed to quantify individual career achievement, both at the level of a single publication, and over an individuals entire career. While some academic careers are defined by a few significant papers (possibly out of many), other academic careers are defined by the cumulative contribution made by the authors publications to the body of science. Several metrics have been formulated to quantify an individuals publication career, yet none of these metrics account for the dependence of citation counts and journal size on time. In this paper, we normalize publication metrics across both time and discipline in order to achieve a universal framework for analyzing and comparing scientific achievement. We study the publication careers of individual authors over the 50-year period 1958-2008 within six high-impact journals: CELL, the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), Nature, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS), Physical Review Letters (PRL), and Science. In comparing the achievement of authors within each journal, we uncover quantifiable statistical regularity in the probability density function (pdf) of scientific achievement across both time and discipline. The universal distribution of career success within these arenas for publication raises the possibility that a fundamental driving force underlying scientific achievement is the competitive nature of scientific advancement.
We study the behavior of U.S. markets both before and after U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, and show that the announcement of a U.S. Federal Reserve rate change causes a financial shock, where the dynamics after the announcement i
s described by an analogue of the Omori earthquake law. We quantify the rate n(t) of aftershocks following an interest rate change at time T, and find power-law decay which scales as n(t-T) (t-T)^-$Omega$, with $Omega$ positive. Surprisingly, we find that the same law describes the rate n(|t-T|) of pre-shocks before the interest rate change at time T. This is the first study to quantitatively relate the size of the market response to the news which caused the shock and to uncover the presence of quantifiable preshocks. We demonstrate that the news associated with interest rate change is responsible for causing both the anticipation before the announcement and the surprise after the announcement. We estimate the magnitude of financial news using the relative difference between the U. S. Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate. Our results are consistent with the sign effect, in which bad news has a larger impact than good news. Furthermore, we observe significant volatility aftershocks, confirming a market underreaction that lasts at least 1 trading day.
