The interaction of competing agents is described by classical game theory. It is now well known that this can be extended to the quantum domain, where agents obey the rules of quantum mechanics. This is of emerging interest for exploring quantum foun
dations, quantum protocols, quantum auctions, quantum cryptography, and the dynamics of quantum cryptocurrency, for example. In this paper, we investigate two-player games in which a strategy pair can exist as a Nash equilibrium when the games obey the rules of quantum mechanics. Using a generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) setting for two-player quantum games, and considering a particular strategy pair, we identify sets of games for which the pair can exist as a Nash equilibrium only when Bells inequality is violated. We thus determine specific games for which the Nash inequality becomes equivalent to Bells inequality for the considered strategy pair.
A significant aspect of the study of quantum strategies is the exploration of the game-theoretic solution concept of the Nash equilibrium in relation to the quantization of a game. Pareto optimality is a refinement on the set of Nash equilibria. A re
finement on the set of Pareto optimal outcomes is known as social optimality in which the sum of players payoffs are maximized. This paper analyzes social optimality in a Bayesian game that uses the setting of generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments for its physical implementation. We show that for the quantum Bayesian game a direct connection appears between the violation of Bells inequality and the social optimal outcome of the game and that it attains a superior socially optimal outcome.
A game-theoretic setting provides a mathematical basis for analysis of strategic interaction among competing agents and provides insights into both classical and quantum decision theory and questions of strategic choice. An outstanding mathematical q
uestion, is to understand the conditions under which a classical game-theoretic setting can be transformed to a quantum game, and under which conditions there is an equivalence. In this paper, we consider quantum games as those that allow non-factorizable probabilities. We discuss two approaches for obtaining a non-factorizable game and study the outcome of such games. We demonstrate how the standard version of a quantum game can be analyzed as a non-factorizable game and determine the limitations of our approach.
As is well known, the common elementary functions defined over the real numbers can be generalized to act not only over the complex number field but also over the skew (non-commuting) field of the quaternions. In this paper, we detail a number of ele
mentary functions extended to act over the skew field of Clifford multivectors, in both two and three dimensions. Complex numbers, quaternions and Cartesian vectors can be described by the various components within a Clifford multivector and from our results we are able to demonstrate new inter-relationships between these algebraic systems. One key relationship that we discover is that a complex number raised to a vector power produces a quaternion thus combining these systems within a single equation. We also find a single formula that produces the square root, amplitude and inverse of a multivector over one, two and three dimensions. Finally, comparing the functions over different dimension we observe that $ Cell left (Re^3 right) $ provides a particularly versatile algebraic framework.
In evolutionary game theory an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that is sometimes also recognized as evolutionary stability. It is a game-theoretic model, well known to mathematical biologists, that
was found quite useful in the understanding of evolutionary dynamics of a population. This chapter presents an analysis of evolutionary stability in the emerging field of quantum games.
