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تسجيل مستخدم جديدEvolutionary stability in quantum games
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In evolutionary game theory an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that is sometimes also recognized as evolutionary stability. It is a game-theoretic model, well known to mathematical biologists, that was found quite useful in the understanding of evolutionary dynamics of a population. This chapter presents an analysis of evolutionary stability in the emerging field of quantum games.
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